Abstract. Unemployed workers in Austria do not lose their unemployment benefits (UI) if they work in a job where their earnings are below a certain threshold ['marginal employment' (ME)]. ME might improve their labour market status by signalling effort, or worsen it through reduced job-search effort. Those who work in ME while claiming UI have less employment and lower earnings afterwards than those who do not. The penalty lessens over time but is still present after three years.
INTRODUCTION
The causes of high unemployment rates in Western Europe are highly debated: among the potential explanations are high-wage levels, which reduce demand for low-skilled workers; restrictive employment contracts and protection laws, which prevent employers from reacting flexibly to demand fluctuations; and generous benefit systems, which provide too little incentive for unemployed workers to return to work.
1 Consequently, many labour market reforms focus on employment contracts that allow for more employment flexibility (e.g. the attempt in France to extend the probationary period of youth workers) or incentives to induce unemployed workers back into employment (e.g. the German Kombilohn).
In Austria, a special employment contract exists, 'marginal employment' (ME), which combines flexibility and incentives. ME is defined by wage income being below a threshold. In 2006, the threshold was h333.16 per month before tax, or about 19% of the median gross wage. ME is an attractive type of contract for employers, because social security contributions are substantially reduced and only minimal employment protection applies. It is attractive for the unemployed, because an unemployed worker does not lose any benefit entitlements while working in ME. ME is similar to a wage subsidy paid to the worker (Katz, 1998; Phelps, 1994) , which has a discontinuity at the threshold, because benefits are fully withdrawn for any wage income above the threshold.
We examine the effect of ME on future employment and earnings of unemployed workers. Potentially, ME may allow workers to stay attached to the labour market and therefore signal motivation. This way it could act as a 'stepping stone' (Booth et al., 2002) . Alternatively, ME could ultimately force workers out of the regular labour market, offering a 'dead end' (Booth et al., 2002) .
For the empirical analysis, we select new entrants into unemployment using data from administrative registers. These data have the advantage of detailing, for each employee, the complete history of labour market spells. We find that on entry into unemployment, many choose to become marginally employed before they start to work in regular employment.
We compare labour market outcomes (days employed and earnings) for the unemployed who start ME before returning to regular employment, with those who do not, for up to three years after the start of the unemployment spell.
Since we have no source of exogenous variation in the entry to ME, which would allow us to model the selection into ME, we use propensity score matching to control for selection on observable characteristics (Dehejia and Whaba, 1999; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . The data provide a wide range of individual characteristics, extensive labour market histories and previous experiences with ME for an appropriate estimation of the propensity score.
Our results show that ME is associated with negative employment outcomes and lower earnings. Even after three years, these workers fare worse than their peers. ME does not facilitate transitions into regular employment as it leads to longer unemployment durations in the short term and, in the medium term, the negative outcomes persist. A programme with a stronger focus on labour supply incentives, not only at the extensive, but also at the intensive margin, might be preferable. This suggests a combination of a more generous wage subsidy programme with active labour market policies, such as suggested by Fertig et al. (2006) . Further, policies narrowly targeted at the needs of specific groups, for example the long-term unemployed or the low-skilled, are found to be more efficient, because they avoid windfall benefits or adverse incentives for some groups (Card et al. 2009 ).
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
In Austria, health, pension and unemployment insurance are compulsory for every employee. Social security contributions are split between the employer and the employee and amount in total to 39.9% of the gross wage. This makes Austrian non-wage labour costs relatively high (see, e.g., US Department of Labor, 2009, Table 15 ). Workers who are marginally employed are, by and large, exempt from compulsory social security. ME is defined by wage income being below a certain limit. In 2006, the monthly limit for ME was h333.16, or about 19% of the median gross wage. For marginally employed workers, the employer has to contribute 1.4% of the gross wage towards the employees' insurance against work-related accidents. In addition, a marginally employed worker may voluntarily enroll into health and pension insurance at a cost of h46 per month. ME is not covered by the unemployment insurance system, but workers are entitled to unemployment insurance benefits [or unemployment assistance (UA)], or to public pension payments, if eligible. The importance of ME in Austria has increased over the past years. Since 1998, employment in ME has increased from about 5.5% of total employment to about 7.5% in 2005 (BockSchappelwein and Mühlberger, 2008) .
In Austria, unemployment benefits (UI) amount to 55% of previous net wages, plus a family allowance. The eligibility period is 20 or 30 weeks, depending on previous work experience. After exhaustion of UI, the unemployed worker can apply for UA, which is means tested on household income. Where the unemployed worker is eligible for UA, it can be claimed indefinitely. Recipients of UI or UA are fully covered by the state health insurance system and the time claiming UI counts towards state pension eligibility.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To motivate our empirical analysis, we introduce a theoretical framework for job searches that describes the choices and decisions of an unemployed worker. In our set-up, unemployed workers are entitled to UI for a fixed period and they search for jobs with the objective of maximizing their future lifetime income. Jobs differ in earnings and we assume that search costs are related to earnings, such that jobs with low earnings require low search costs. Thereby, our concept of search costs covers both the costs of effort and the income loss during the search. We assume, however, that search costs are finite and every unemployed worker is able to find a job within the maximum entitlement period.
2
Marginal jobs have special status among low-wage jobs, because workers can keep their UI. In comparison, jobs with earnings above the marginal threshold are less attractive, because benefits are fully withdrawn. This discontinuity in the budget line creates a dichotomous choice for the workers at the beginning of the unemployment spell. They have the option to search for ME and receive benefits for as long as possible, or, alternatively, search for a high-earning job (i.e. a regular job) and incur higher costs. Because workers maximize lifetime earnings, the decision will not be determined by earnings over the benefit entitlement period alone, but they will also take future earnings into account. To model the long-term earnings perspectives, we assume that workers who found regular employment will keep it forever. The unemployed in ME have a strong incentive to start searching for regular employment when their benefits expire to avoid a big drop in income.
The decision whether to search for ME or regular employment thus depends on several factors. First of all, it depends on a worker's time preference and liquidity constraints. Workers with a high discount rate will choose ME, because it results in an immediate increase of income, while the costly search for regular employment implies that income at the beginning of the unemployment spell is low. The same holds for workers with credit constraints who have limited access to future income and no possibility to smooth consumption over extended periods of unemployment (Chetty, 2008) . Second, and more importantly, the decision also depends on the effects of ME on future search costs and earnings. If ME acts as a stepping stone, it might lead to a reduction of search costs, for example if the worker is able to transfer to regular employment with the same employer or gets into contact with potential employers while marginally employed. On the other hand, if ME is a negative signal to employers, search costs for ME workers might increase in later periods. The same considerations apply for earnings from regular jobs found after ME. In the stepping stone scenario, long-term earnings differences between workers 2. This assumption is supported by the data. We find that about 70% of our sample enters a regular job within six months and 85% find a job within a year. The remaining individuals are discouraged workers who exit the labour force, workers moving to self-employment or workers leaving the country. Some 50% of the unemployed who work in ME find regular employment within six months and over the longer term this rate also approaches 85%.
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r 2010 The Authors German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik who choose the ME and those who choose regular employment might be small or even positive. If, however, workers lose human capital due to a prolonged absence from the regular labour market, long-term earnings of those opting for ME might be lower than those of workers who decide to search for regular employment. Our model predicts a clear pattern of timing of employment and earnings. In the beginning, we should see longer unemployment durations for the unemployed opting for ME than for those who search for regular employment, because of the income advantage of claiming UI and the additional earnings from ME.
3 Differences in later periods should be driven by the effects of ME on search costs and wages in subsequent regular jobs. Our special interest is therefore in the mediumterm differences in earnings and employment between workers deciding for marginal versus regular employment at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
EMPIRICAL MODEL
Motivated by the considerations above, our empirical analyses focus on the medium-term consequences of ME. We sample workers entering unemployment and compare those taking up ME within the first six months of their unemployment spell, the 'ME group', with workers who do not enter ME before their unemployment spell ends, the 'control group'. 4 We choose a cut-off of six months because this is the average UI entitlement period.
For each group, we consider the number of days employed and monthly earnings in regular jobs in the first three years after entry into unemployment as outcome variables. In a first step, we compare employment and earnings in the first year to establish the consistency with our theoretical assumptions. Then we turn to the detailed analysis of employment and earnings in years two and three, which we regard as the main outcome variables.
To account for non-randomness in the choice to start ME, we control for observable characteristics measured at the start of the unemployment spell, using regression and propensity score matching techniques. Our approach is valid, if, conditional on all information available at the start of the unemployment spell, starting ME is random. In our context, this assumption -the 'conditional independence assumption' (CIA) -implies that, at the start of the unemployment spell, the unemployed search for either ME or regular employment and do not change their decisions over time. We have argued above that this is plausible because of the institutional background.
5 The data provide extremely rich information on the unemployed and we have information about social and demographic characteristics, as well as extensive information on past labour market experience, such as employment, unemployment, wages and numbers of jobs held before the start of the unemployment spell. Given that individuals' labour market decisions are correlated over time, a comparison of individuals with similar labour market histories 3. In this respect our theory relates to models of strategic unemployment (Angerhausen et al., 2010) . 4. We drop unemployed individuals entering ME after six months from the sample. 5. An alternative approach would have been to assign to every individual from the control group a fabricated ME start date based on their observable characteristics and to keep only individuals for whom the unemployment spell includes the ME start in the comparison sample (Lechner, 1999) . Freier and Steiner (2007) use a similar approach to the one we use, however, they restrict their sample to those who are at least three months in unemployment and compare those who start ME in the subsequent nine months with those who do not.
should adequately control for selection into ME (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009 ). The estimation of the effects of ME on medium-term labour market outcomes consists of two steps. First, we estimate the propensity score of starting ME. The estimations include detailed information on the five years before the unemployment spell. To assess our estimates of the propensity score, we group observations into blocks with similar values of the estimated propensity scores to see whether the distributions coincide or not. In case the distributions do not coincide, we 'balance' the distributions by including lags and interaction terms (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) . We select for each observation in the ME group an observation from the control group that is closest in terms of the propensity score, using nearest neighbour matching. 6 Because we allow for replacement, a single control can be the best match of more than one observation.
There are several approaches to assessing the sensitivity of the estimated treatment effect with respect to the CIA (Altonji et al., 2005; Ichino et al., 2008; Imbens, 2003; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . They are all based on the idea that the CIA might only be satisfied conditional on an additional unobserved covariate. Given assumptions about the effect of this unobserved covariate on the outcome and its correlation with the treatment, it is possible to trace out potential changes in the treatment effect. The aim of the sensitivity analysis is then to find out how large the change in the treatment effect could be for reasonable assumptions about the unobserved covariate. We will come back to the sensitivity analysis in the discussion of the estimation results.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We use data on individual labour market careers from Austrian administrative records. Our sample consists of the total inflow into unemployment between March and August 1999.
7 To avoid conflicts with time spent in education, or (early) retirement, we only consider workers between 20 and 50 years of age. This leaves us with a sample of 193,276 unemployed. All our analyses are carried out separately for women (93, 896) and men (99,380).
We combine individual data from two different sources: (i) the Austrian social security database, which contains detailed information on the individuals' employment, unemployment and earnings history, and information on the employer and (ii) the Austrian unemployment register from which we get socioeconomic characteristics. We use information on employment and wage histories for the period 1993-2001, i.e. five years before and three years after the start of the spell. The records contain, for each day, information on the labour market status and we distinguish between regular employment, ME, unemployment and non-participation.
On entry into unemployment, history and outcomes are measured in one-year intervals from that date. 8 We focus on the outcome measures in the second and 6. We use Stata and the routines by Becker and Ichino (2002) , who also provide details on the matching methods. 7. We define an individual as unemployed if she is either collecting unemployment benefits or actively searching for work, but not working in regular employment. For those with multiple spells in this period, we select the first unemployment spell. 8. Our approach differs from Kvasnicka (2009) . No wages are available for marginal jobs and earnings are set equal to zero for individuals with no regular employment during the whole year. While the data are appropriate for our research as they provide precise labour market histories for a long period, they also have limitations.
The most restricting limitation for our application is that the data do not detail the hours of work and we therefore cannot identify part-time work.
9
In Figure 1 , we plot for our sample of unemployed workers the monthly share of marginal workers, from 1994 to 2004. The inflow period into unemployment March-August 1999 is marked by vertical lines. The share of ME increases sharply on entry into unemployment, it increases by about two percentage points for women and by about one percentage point for men. The shares of ME revert to the trend over the following six months. Table 1 presents summary statistics of our sample. 10 The control group consists of 178,427 workers, among them 84,105 women. We have 5,571 women and 3,119 men who started ME within six months of becoming unemployed. The share of ME among women (8.5%) is twice as high as among men (4.2%). With respect to socioeconomic characteristics, there are no striking differences between the ME and the control group, perhaps with the exception that there were fewer foreign citizens and fewer were entitled to UI benefits among those who started ME; however, even these differences are small. Perhaps the most striking difference between the ME and the control group is the previous incidence of ME among those who start ME during the unemployment spell. Women who start ME had already worked nine weeks (18% of the year) in ME in the year before the unemployment spell; those in the control group only about two weeks. For men, we find a similar pattern: those in the ME group had spent on average six weeks in ME and those in the control group about one week in ME in the year before the unemployment spell. Members of the ME group had consistently fewer days in regular employment, they had earned lower wages and they had had more days in ME than those in the control group.
The differences in the take-up of ME, and part-time work in general, as well as other compositional differences, suggest that we conduct all our analyses separately for men and women. Some of the differences in the prevalence of ME are due to the use of ME at the sectoral level. Flexible employment adjustments are more common in female-dominated industries, such as tourism, services and sales. Although not shown here, all our estimates include a set of industry controls.
The mean differences in the outcome variables between the ME and the control groups are tabulated in Table 2 . As expected, employment and earnings are considerably lower in the ME group during the first year for both women and men. In the second and third year, female ME workers work as many days as women in the control group, but their earnings are still (significantly) lower. For men, we find that, even after three years, there are substantial differences in the number of days employed and in the monthly earnings. All outcomes appear to be more adverse for men than for women. In addition, the fraction of men who started ME is only half that of women and therefore selection by gender might play an important role for interpreting the ME effects. To get a first impression about how much of the mean differences in outcomes are driven by compositional effects, we use linear regressions to adjust for a range of observable characteristics. Results are tabulated Note: The ME group consists of unemployed workers who start ME within six months of their unemployment spell; the unemployed in the comparison group have no ME spell before entering a job. Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 4 and 5 present ME effects from OLS regressions using age, education, nationality, marital status, region, occupation, month of entry into unemployment, employment, unemployment, marginal employment and earning histories of the last five years as covariates. R 2 denote the adjusted R 2 .
in columns 3 and 4. The OLS results yield slightly smaller negative effects, especially for men.
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As a test for the validity of our research design, we investigate entry rates in ME and regular jobs by unemployment duration. 12 The hazard rates into ME are highest at short unemployment durations and decline steadily thereafter. The pattern contradicts a model where individuals change their opinion about ME over time and become more likely to start ME, the longer their unemployment spell lasts. The hazards of starting a regular job by elapsed unemployment duration are highest at short unemployment durations, especially for men. ME workers tend to start regular jobs later than non-marginal workers; their hazard rates equal those of non-ME workers after about 12-15 weeks.
RESULTS

Propensity scores
We estimate the propensity score with a logit model of the probability to start ME, using a range of the workers' characteristics, including the labour market history up to five years in the past. In addition, we include interaction terms and polynomials in order to balance the distributions of explanatory variables between the control and ME groups.
13
Figure 2 shows box plots of the distributions of propensity scores for the ME and the control groups, for men and women. These plots provide a comparison of the ME and the control group.
14 A wider overlap in the distributions of the propensity scores results in better matches between observations in the treatment group and observations in the control group. The box plots show that the propensity scores are lower than 0.3 for women and lower than 0.2 for men for most of the observations in our data. While observations in the control group have typically lower values of the propensity score than those who started ME, the distributions do overlap and provide adequate support for the matching procedures. Figure 3 plots the estimated propensity scores against wages in the second and third year after entry into unemployment. We group the estimated propensity scores into 40 blocks of equal size and calculate average outcomes for ME and controls in each block. The difference in outcomes in each block provides the ME effect at a constant value of the propensity score, i.e. holding observable characteristics fixed. The graphs reveal that workers who started ME within six months of becoming unemployed earned lower wages two and three years after becoming unemployed than those who did not. Focusing on days employed yields similar patterns. The downward sloping pattern of the graphs indicates that ME workers tend to be negatively selected, because workers with higher propensities to be in ME have, on average, lower earnings.
11. Details of the regressions are presented in Böheim and Weber (2006) . 12. Detailed results are provided in the working paper version, Böheim and Weber (2006) . 13. The estimation results are detailed in Böheim and Weber (2006) and show that selection into ME is associated with characteristics usually associated with inferior labour market outcomes, i.e. they are young, have little formal education and interrupted employment careers. 14. The box plots depict for each of the four groups the distribution of the propensity scores. The lines within the grey boxes give the medians. For sake of clarity, we have excluded outliers from the graph; however, the outliers are used in our calculations. The maximum propensity scores are 0.669 for men, no ME; 0.714 for men, ME; 0.661 for women, no ME; 0.685, women, ME.
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Matching estimates
Our estimations of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) are presented in Table 3 . 15 By looking at the outcome variables in the second year after the start of the unemployment spell, we see that women with ME work about four days less Figure 2 Distribution of the estimated propensity score in ME and control group Figure 3 Estimated outcomes of ME 15. The choice of matching method matters little, the differences between the estimated ATTs are small if we use the stratification method (Böheim and Weber, 2006) . per year than women in the control group. The difference is, however, not statistically significant at conventional levels. For men, the difference is some 12 days. When we consider earnings, we estimate that those with ME earn less than those with no ME. For women, it is about h70 less per month, or about 7% of the control group's average wage in the second year. For men, the difference is about h130 per month, or about 10% of the control group's average wage.
In the third year after the start of the unemployment spell, the differences between those with and those without ME are somewhat smaller than in the second year. However, we still estimate a negative effect of starting ME on labour market outcomes, be it days employed or monthly earnings. Women with ME are estimated to spend about two days less in employment (not statistically significant) and they earned h59, or about 7%, less per month than women in the control group. Men with ME spent about ten days less in employment and earned h90, or about 7%, less per month than men in the control group. Overall, we find negative effects of ME on all employment and wage outcomes. Note that the estimated results from the matching procedure are fairly similar to our OLS estimates and also to the mean differences between ME and controls, presented in Table 2 . This suggests that selection based on observable variables is not driving the results. If we were to speculate about potential selection due to an unobservable characteristic, we would have to assume that its influence on selection is even greater than all the observable variables in order to erase or reverse the effect of ME. Given the detailed individual characteristics and labour market histories, this does not seem plausible (see Altonji et al., 2005) .
Men are more affected by ME than women. The medium-term results point at small and negative employment effects of about one week. The wage effects are considerable even in the third year after the start of an unemployment spell. Because the differences in employment are relatively small, the difference in wages between ME and controls is arguably a pure wage loss effect.
Robustness checks
1. Elapsed unemployment duration. It is probable that some workers' risk of ME increases with the duration of unemployment, while for others this risk might be falling. We have re-estimated the ATTs, restricting the sample to those who start ME within the first three months of unemployment. All effects are smaller for this restricted sample than for the larger sample used above. For example, we estimate that the effect of ME for women two years after becoming unemployed on days employed is effectively zero, but they earn about h44 less per month. For men, the effects are also smaller. This indicates that, although we cannot fully control for selection into ME by matching on the conditions at the start of the unemployment spell, the changes in behaviour over time have a minor impact on the estimated causal effect. The main result is unchanged by the choice of the ME group; ME has a small negative impact on future employment and a substantial negative wage effect in all samples. 2. Selection effects. While most unemployed enter unemployment from a previous job, not all of them do so. ME is attractive, amongst other things, because it provides relatively cheap access to social insurance. Arguably some workers are less attached to the labour market, for example those who start searching for a job without being entitled to UI, and have therefore different search strategies than workers who are closely attached to the labour market.
To investigate this further, we restrict our sample to workers who enter unemployment directly from employment, rather than from any other labour market state. (Entry period to ME is six months.) The results from this exercise show a greater penalty from working ME in subsequent periods than the results presented above. The negative effects of ME again lessen over time, but they are still sizeable in the third year after the start of the unemployment spell. In particular, focusing on the medium-term outcomes after three years, we estimate for women in this subset a wage penalty of about h51 per month, in comparison with their peers who did not start ME. For men, the wage penalty is about h104. Previous experience of ME makes a worker more likely to start ME again, all other things equal. The previous experience of ME, although we control for this in the estimation of the propensity score, might be associated with unobserved characteristics that are correlated with our outcome measures. We also restrict the sample to workers who had no experience of ME in the five years before the unemployment spell and estimate the ATTs of ME. The negative effects are slightly less severe for women and slightly more negative for men than in the sample used above.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the consequences of working in ME for unemployed workers. A priori it is not clear if those who work in ME improve their labour market status by, for example, signalling effort, or worsen it by reducing their job search efforts. Our results strongly indicate that for unemployed workers there is no positive consequence of ME on subsequent regular employment. We find that earnings are lower for those who started ME than for those who did not. The effects are greater and more persistent over time for men than for women and after three years on becoming unemployed, women who started ME earn about 6% less than women who did not, and for men, the earnings differential is about 7%. The persistent wage penalty could arise from the fact that those who started ME have a preference for part-time work and those in the control group seek full-time employment. The difference in wages would thus be merely driven by the resulting difference in hours worked. While this is a possible critique of our results -we do not know the number of hours worked -we do not consider it a likely explanation, because although the number of female part-time workers has increased, part-time is still almost negligible for men. Women are substantially more likely to select into ME than men. Our results are in line with the US evidence in Autor and Houseman (2005) and indicate that, while some temporary jobs may lift workers into regular employment, this form of low-wage employment reduces medium-term chances in the labour market.
An extension of the wage subsidy towards jobs with higher wages would create incentives for the unemployed to extend their labour supply to jobs paying above the threshold. A gradual reduction of benefits, in line with increased labour supply, to eliminate the drastic discontinuity at the threshold, would ease transitions into regular employment. Social security contributions could be reduced for these jobs to create an incentive for employers to hire more workers. Of course, the subsidy has to be limited in time and restricted to specially targeted groups, for example, the long-term unemployed, in order to prevent windfall beneficiaries. Positive experiences with similar programmes exist in the US, Canada and the United Kingdom, where they were part of the welfare reforms (Blundell and Hoynes, 2004; Card and Hyslop, 2005) . A way to improve the chances of marginally employed workers in the labour market would be to integrate ME into the government's active labour market policy, where employment programmes, for example placement in private sector firms, already exist.
